Monday, 19 September 2016

Friedrich Nietzsche’s The Twilight of the Idols..some thoughts on Conservatism and Classical Liberalism



The following is section no. 43 of “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man” from Friedrich Nietzsche’s The Twilight of the Idols.

Whispered to the conservatives. — What was not known formerly, what is known, or might be known, today: a reversion, a return in any sense or degree is simply not possible. We physiologists know that. Yet all priests and moralists have believed the opposite — they wanted to take mankind back, to screw it back, to a former measure of virtue. Morality was always a bed of Procrustes. Even the politicians have aped the preachers of virtue at this point: today too there are still parties whose dream it is that all things might walk backwards like crabs. But no one is free to be a crab. Nothing avails: one must go forward — step by step further into decadence (that is my definition of modern “progress”). One can check this development and thus dam up degeneration, gather it and make it more vehement and sudden: one can do no more.

When the feudal world broke down, something changed; a sort of human energy that had been shackled was set free upon the western world. Everyone who was anyone was trying to figure out what to do and how to handle this new energy. One body of thought that emerged was classical liberalism; philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, Smith, Bentham, and Mill put forward ideas focusing on the individual and rights inherent. Other thinkers, such as Rousseau, Marx, and Nietzsche, had some critiques to offer. In this paper, I intend to lie out the cross cutting themes of liberalism as a body of thought and then contrast the criticisms made by Rousseau and Nietzsche, such as 'general will' as the sovereign and that the modern, post-Enlightenment state produced nothing more than the politics of a herd.

Classical liberalism is a political ideology that embraces individual rights, private property and a laissez-faire economy, a government that exists to protect the liberty of each individual from others, and a constitution that protects individual autonomy from governmental power.[1] It first emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries and was founded on ideas of individualism and free market economics with a focus on individual autonomy and, again, private property. The sole legitimate function of government is to defend these individual rights and a particular emphasis is placed on the sovereignty of the individual. Each of the above liberal thinkers offered their unique take on the detailed implementation of such governmental structures, but the consensus seemed to be that individuals are the basis of law and society, and that society and its institutions exist to further the ends of individuals. Classical liberalism makes use of a social contract, under which citizens make the laws and agree to abide by the laws they have made: It is based on the belief that individuals know best what is best for them

"Civil man is born, lives, and dies in slavery. At his birth the infant is bound up in swaddling clothes; at his death he is nailed down in his coffin. As long as he keeps a human form he is enchained by by our institutions."[2] Rousseau was critical of existing society, claiming that private "property, in itself (is) the source of a thousand quarrels and conflicts:"



"...from the moment one man began to stand in need of the help of another; from the moment it appeared advantageous to any one man to have enough provisions for two, equality disappeared, property was introduced, work became indispensable, and vast forests became smiling fields, which man had to water with the sweat of his brow, and where slavery and misery were soon seen to germinate and grow up with the crops."[3]

Although it is property that brings about war, conflict, and thus the need for a civil state, Rousseau believed that society could be improved if all individuals shared equally in the construction of laws for their common general happiness. Rousseau wanted a social order whose laws were in greatest harmony with the fundamental laws of (or state of) nature. This is, Rousseau's social contract was to allow the individual to be is absorbed into the common, general will, without losing his own will: "...a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force [of] the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before. This is the fundamental problem of which the Social Contract provides the solution."[4]

The individual loses nothing and gains in return the assurance that he will be protected by the full force of society against the the wills of other individuals and groups. He is now a member of a society of equals and has regained an equality not unlike the one he enjoyed in nature - but in a new form and on a higher level.

Rousseau goes on to state: "If then we discard from the social compact what is not of its essence, we shall find that it reduces itself to the following terms: 'Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.'" What exactly this 'general will' is deserves much more discussion than this paper allows, but I contest that this is Rousseau's most direct criticism of liberalism. Book II of The Social Contract opens with a discussion of 'general will', so I must refer the reader thereto for fuller explanation. In short, the public person formed by social contract, the sovereign, has a will of its own: 'general will.' What it wills is always the true interest of what every citizen actually wants, whether they realize it or not. When you are forced to obey it, you really are only obeying yourself, the true and free you.

According to Rousseau's theory of social contract, we leave an anarchical state of nature by voluntarily transferring our personal rights to society generally in return for security of life and property. He argues that people should form a society to which they would completely surrender themselves, and by giving up these rights, we actually create a new entity in the form of a public 'sovereign' that would be directed by a general will. When we join the community, we voluntarily agree to comply with the 'general will' of the community.

The result of this seems to be that all power, individuals, and hence their rights, are under the control and direction of the entire community. This means that no one can do anything without the consent of all. Everyone is totally dependent on everybody else for all aspects of their lives. In stanch defiance of classical liberal ideals of individuality and such, this universal dependency eliminates the possibility of independent individual achievement. Perhaps inequality is disposed of, but only at the cost of everything individual.

Nietzsche, against the claims of liberals that they act to defend the rights and interests of individuals, claimed that the very reverse was true: democracy acted only to protect the rights of the majority; that is, of the mass or herd. He puts forth an argument regarding "the old lie, [to] the slogan of resentment about the privileged rights of the majority, in opposition to that will for a low condition, abasement, equality, for the decline and extinguishing of mankind—in opposition to all that there rang out a fearsome and delightful counter-slogan about the privileged rights of the few!"[5] There could be no reconciliation, Nietzsche felt, between the rights of the few and those of the many, and one of the fundamental problems of liberal democracy was that it insisted on maintaining and defending the latter. What Nietzsche called for was an end to the slave mentality that saturated his contemporary Europe and a raising of

"...the human being who possesses his own independent and enduring will, who is entitled to make promises—and in him a proud consciousness, quivering in every muscle, of what has finally been achieved and given living embodiment in him: a real consciousness of power and freedom, a feeling of completion for human beings generally."[5]

Nietzsche says the new goal of mankind comes from within - a mastery of oneself. This new sovereign individual will overcome all of the problems that Nietzsche saw in the society of Europe. His will is liberated from the morality of custom: "the autonomous individual beyond morality"[5]. Nietzsche calls him the 'overman' - a type of supreme achievement. The life of the 'overman' is will to power and the virtues he will embody are contrary to those Nietzsche saw in the herd around him. The self-overcoming man will not only define his life according to himself, as opposed to the resentment of the herd, but he will also rid himself of the pity of the weak members of society.

Clearly this ideal is far removed from the prescriptions of classical liberals. They are egalitarians interested foremost in equality and leveling – Nietzsche favors aristocracy and does not value equality, for he thought that democratic equality was an impediment to human excellence precisely because it builds the 'herd morality.' It puts people down, limits them, and promises them less than what they deserve. In order for human excellence to develop freely, Nietzsche says there should not be any equality constraint on people: an 'overman' should not be shackled in order to make him equal to a 'slave'; people should be allowed to compete freely for power and, naturally, the 'overman' will win the competition and be among the rulers of human society.

Rousseau and Nietzsche mount two very contrasting criticisms of classical liberalism. Rousseau's concern is that the 'general will' be obeyed; Nietzsche's is the rise of the 'overman.' For Rousseau, classical liberalism is to criticized for its lack of equality while for Nietzsche it is for forcing too much of it. It seems to me that the criticism of Rousseau has traditionally been regarded as the more significant of the two here presented. I have always found the arguments of the classical liberals appealing; their ideals of personal, individual, and inalienable rights of life, liberty, and property are ones I have always identified with.

Upon reflection of the above criticisms, though, I have gathered an increased sense of the delicate balance needed to secure them. I find Rousseau's critiques to be less appealing than what Nietzsche has to offer, as I would much rather strive to be an 'overman', and find myself in a society where such possibility exists, then follow the direction of the 'general will.' Rousseau's prescriptions do allow for a greater security and equality for all, but it is the individual opportunity and authenticity that Nietzsche lies out I embrace. I see elements of both critiques in our current society, a clash of instituted herd-ism with individuals seeking to overcome. I do not venture to assume what either Rousseau or Nietzsche may think of our modern society, but I will assume that neither would be satisfied.

Classical liberalism was born during a time of immense transition and change throughout Europe and the entire Western world. Feudalism was extinguishing and a sense of nationalism was emerging – a whole new human energy came into bloom and had to be dealt with. Some sought to control, channel, and suppress it; others to cultivate and watch it grow. The individual was taking precedent, and what this meant was the focus of much debate. Two extreme views were maintained by Rousseau and Nietzsche as criticisms to the mainstream thought. One was to promote equality to all and security by submitting to a 'general will' and the other was to overcome all imposed morality and actualize full potentials. Although I find myself in favor of Nietzsche's prescriptions, he failed to outline any discernible political system, remaining instead highly apolitical, and I believe that is why the detailed and systematized prescriptions of Rousseau's social contract have been regarded as the more significant criticism of classical liberalism.


[1] Sturgis, Amy H. The Rise, Decline, and Reemergence of Classical Liberalism,
The LockeSmith Institute, 1994 http://www.belmont.edu/lockesmith/essay.html

[2] Rousseau, Jean Jacques, Emile, or On Education, Paris, 1762

http://www.ilt.columbia.edu/pedagogies/rousseau/em_eng_bk1.html

[3] Rousseau, Jean Jacques, A Discourse On A Subject Proposed By The Academy of Dijon: What Is The Origin Of Inequality Among Men, And Is It Authorised By Natural Law?, 1754 http://www.constitution.org/jjr/ineq.txt

[4] Rousseau, Jean Jacques, The Social Contract Or Principles Of Political Right, 1762

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