The Animal That Therefore I Am is the complete text of Jacques
Derrida’s ten-hour address to the 1997 Cerisy conference entitled “The
Autobiographical Animal.” H-Animal readers probably are familiar with
portions of the book: the first of the four sections and title essay
appeared in Critical Inquiry in 2002 and was reprinted in an abridged
form in Peter Atterton and Matthew Calarco’s Animal Philosophy (2004).
The third section, “And Say the Animal Responded,” appeared in Cary
Wolfe’s edited volume, Zoontologies in 2003. This edition presents
updated translations of these essays and adds two new sections, now
published posthumously. “But As For Me, Who Am I Following,” focuses on
an often unacknowledged or even disavowed animal question in Descartes,
Kant, and Levinas, and “I don’t know why we are doing this” offers a
further reading of “the animal” in Heidegger, coming back to points
that Derrida raised earlier in the conference and in earlier texts such
as On Spirit (1987). This last section, as editor Marie-Louise Mallet
explains in her introduction, posed some specific problems since, unlike
the previous lectures, which were written “in toto,” this one was fully
improvised. It was published from a sound recording and thus reopens
questions of difference between speech and writing that Derrida wrote
about early in his career.
With this complete text, readers will
gain greater clarity on the significance and stakes for Derrida of what
it might mean to be or to follow an animal. (The title in French,
L’Animal que donc je suis, plays on the double meaning of je suis: “I
am” and “I follow”). I say “might mean” because the word “animal” is
always, for Derrida, a stand-in for something that cannot be seized or
contained. “Animal” is a word, more importantly, that misidentifies
often with violent consequences, a word that, if we cannot get away from
(and that seems difficult), should be “under erasure.” Readers will
also find that certain themes, which were only briefly alluded to in the
single essays, grow in emphasis as they reappear, almost
symptomatically, throughout the lectures. These include issues regarding
sexual difference, regarding time (especially time the philosopher may
not have), and, especially, issues about tracking. Tracking recalls the
early Derridean theory of the trace--that unconscious logic which haunts
the path of argument, and here reaffirms the seeking of knowledge or
information as a habit that human and nonhuman animals of different
species share: we follow signs, scents, clues, not always knowing where
or to what or whom they may lead us, indeed, not knowing also how they
may become part of us.
Reading these lectures successively one
gets a sense of Derrida’s own method as a kind of tracking. He picks up a
word or sign, follows it a while, lets it drop as another scent
overpowers it, then follows that one, only to have it return him to the
former, now rediscovered in a slightly changed context. This can be a
frustrating journey at times, but in its almost impulsive ferreting, it
enacts the idea of following as both an evolutionary and an intellectual
activity. As the philosopher tracks the animal question in a tradition
leading from Descartes to Heidegger, we sense neither the anxiety of
influence nor the anxiety of descent, but a gracious indebtedness to
those he follows for what he has learned from them, and for the tools he
now turns against them.
Derrida’s intellectual tracking, that is
to say, takes him to very different ends from those of his
predecessors, if not to, in his estimation, new beginnings. Neither
Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, Levinas, nor Lacan, he claims, has given
such sustained attention to the question of the animal. In particular,
neither has questioned the singularity of that term, “the animal”--“a
name [men] have given themselves the right and the authority to give to
the living other” (p. 23). And yet, the very history of who we think we
are as humans is tied up in distinguishing ourselves from this other we
have named and subjected--subjected for the sake of claiming
subjectivity as our exclusive property. This history, this autobiography
of the human, has nevertheless reached an unprecedented moment that
makes such questioning imperative. It is not the fact of subjection that
has changed, he emphasizes, it is the means, and volume of this
subjection in modernity. Derrida’s “following,” thus entails both
historical hindsight and a sense of urgency: “No one today can deny this
event--that is the unprecedented proportions of this subjection of the
animal.... Neither can one seriously deny the disavowal that this
involves” (p. 25). Derrida will not participate in the same disavowal
and is not afraid to use the words that others may have shied away
from--holocaust, genocide--to describe in detail the kinds of violence
done to animals through industrial farming or biological experimentation
and manipulation, all for the “putative human well-being of man” (p.
25). As Matthew Callarco explains, Derrida’s work is aimed at
undercutting the kinds of humanist hierarchies that oppose such
analogies as scandalous simply because they compare human and nonhuman
life.[1]
While Derrida thus emphasizes the way in which “zoe” or
animal life has come to mean a life of suffering, his first concern as
philosopher is the result this has on “bios”--the biography or meaning
that humans give to themselves. In tracking and deconstructing the
subject from Descartes through Lacan, he attempts to uncover the
fraudulent grounds on which the human has been defined in opposition to
the animal and thereby claimed superiority over it. If thinking is, as
Descartes posits, the essence of what or who I am as human, that is the
cause of my being as human, Derrida asks how we know that thinking is so
different from sniffing or scenting and “why this zone of sensibility
is so neglected or reduced to a secondary position in philosophy and the
arts?” (p. 55). Following a similar path in Kant, he contends that
insofar as the thoughts of those I follow become my thoughts, I must
accept, even “welcome,” an “irreducible heteroaffection” at my core. In
other words, I am moved not of my own volition but by an other within
me. My “autonomy,” to take the term that is essential for Kant’s
delineation of the human and reprisal of the Cartesian cogito, is in no
way assured. To the extent that I may be moved by and moved in my
thinking by an animal, as Derrida appears to have been moved to write
these lectures by the look of his cat, I demonstrate that the self is
not autonomous, and its heteronomous “other” is not necessarily human.
So where does this leave Derrida’s now famous cat, we might ask? Those
readers looking for an ethology that tells us more of how the world or
the philosopher/human looks from the viewpoint of a cat or other animal
will be disappointed. Donna Haraway has written of this disappointment
and criticized Derrida for missing an opportunity to “seriously consider
an alternative form of engagement ... one that risked knowing something
more about cats and how to look back, perhaps even scientifically,
biologically, and therefore also philosophically and intimately.”[2]
Similarly, those looking for an ethics or a guide for how to live or be
with nonhuman animals will also be disappointed. But that is not to say
that the deconstruction of the subject is without ethical value. Derrida
addresses the question of ethics directly in the second section in a
number of pages devoted to Emmanuel Levinas whose deeply thoughtful
writings on ethics and alterity had great influence on Derrida and
concludes that he has put “the animal outside of the ethical circuit”(p.
106). He finds this “disavowal” of the animal/other surprising, given
the “great intangible Judaic principle” of life that underlies much of
Levinasian ethics. But this principle of life remains unthought, covered
over by his notions of death and the face, which remain grounded in a
stubborn humanism: only humans properly die (and thus must not be
killed); only a human has a naked face that reveals "his" vulnerability
and calls me to respond to it, to be responsible to or for it. Levinas
thus must be included in the tradition of those whose understanding of
the subject, even as it is deeply grounded in otherness because moved by
and responsive to it, is exclusive of “the animal.”
Derrida’s
discussion of Levinas uncovers a parallel between this exclusion of
consideration of the animal and that of sexual difference, especially in
relation to the theme of nudity that runs through Levinas, and as a
result, in relation to who/what has ethical standing. Despite what some
might want to find in Levinas’s discussion of Bobby, the dog who
befriended him in a concentration camp, dogs and women are denied an
opening to ethics. Could it be that the “sacrificial war” against the
animal,” which Derrida says is as old as Genesis (p. 101), is also
linked to the war against “the feminine”--a term that has been similarly
essentialized with often violent effects? Derrida briefly addresses
sexual difference earlier in a comparison of two narratives of Genesis.
In the first version Ish, or Adam, is described as male and female and
the couple is given authority over the animals in obedience to
God.Naming of the animals, however, only takes place in the second
version where Adam is described as male alone, before woman. Responding
to the names Adam gives them, moreover, the animals come after or follow
him (rather than vice versa), as does woman. Such naming, Derrida
suggests through a compelling reading of a passage from Walter Benjamin,
is necessarily linked to death and is what renders the animals mortal.
The name of “the animal,” delineating the ultimate ethical difference
from the human, is also what renders them capable of being sacrificed.
Derrida does not pursue the potential consequences of the first
narrative, in which women are present and naming does not take place,
preferring to track the disavowals in philosophy and religion that are
linked to the “phallogocentrism” of the second. Disavowal is a term
repeated frequently in the lectures and with the full psychoanalytic
meaning of denying a reality that has potentially traumatic
implications. Whether that trauma be the Darwinian one of descent or the
Freudian one of sexual difference, Derrida’s experience with his cat
seems to bring him face to face with what his philosophical predecessors
would not or could not see (hence the exclusions)--that an animal, like
a woman, has a point of view--an “other” point of view on me and on the
world. As David Wills suggests, Derrida recasts the scene of Genesis in
such a way that consciousness of nudity and hence vulnerable
subjectivity is awakened by this animal gaze and is strengthened by the
gaze of a woman imagined to be witnessing the scene, perhaps in a
mirror. If Derrida’s readings of his predecessors’ disavowals are
masterful in their insights, this scene of avowal reveals a “malaise” of
identity and shame that cannot be mastered but only exacerbated into a
shame of shame. Here are the beginnings of autobiography, the moment
when this mirroring of gazes and multiplying selves brings Derrida to
posit his “I,” a human and male “I,” as “a living creature of the
masculine sex, even if he does so with all the complexity that he thinks
he has to recall and lay claim to at every occasion, even suspecting
that an autobiography of any consequence cannot not touch on this
assurance of saying “I am a man,” I am a woman,” I am a man who is also a
woman” (p. 58). Ecce animot, it would be easier to say--Derrida’s
invented word for that which cannot be separated easily into species or
sex, and whose identity is only maintained by a word, a mot.
The
scene with the cat thus evokes something of that fluidity of identity
(where otherness is explicitly the other--animal or animot) that
branches of feminism acknowledged and embraced at least since the 70s.
While not referencing feminism, Derrida seems to demonstrate what many
feminists theorized: that fear of such fluidity is a masculine fear, and
the need to guard against it (to disavow) is productive of specifically
masculine forms of hiding or dissimulation. The term animot, should not
be read as a term to stave off or overcome this fear whether through
the denial of difference or the acceptance of a transspecies or
transgendered appellation. Difference is not to be overcome, but rather
as the plural heard in animot (animaux) suggests, it is to be
pluralized, calling attention to the many differences that may or may
not distinguish sexes and species. These are also differences that we
harbor in ourselves, differences from the names we give ourselves,
differences from the human-animal we think we are. “We no longer know
how many we are then, all males and females of us. And I maintain that
autobiography has begun there” (p. 58).
This recognition of my
indebtedness to the animot or to the animal others I follow and whose
look calls me and my certainties about the world into question forms the
base of what Matthew Callarco has called the “proto-ethical” in
Derrida.[3] This look prepares me, if it does not compel me, to address
the vulnerabilities we share as living, mortal beings, as they also
bring me to acknowledge the qualities and talents of an other I may know
little of and may not know despite my efforts to name him or her.
Derrida’s final lecture on Heidegger suggests that a more ethical
mitsein or living with our animal/others may, in fact, depend on giving
up the knowledge of world that is associated with Dasein. Do we, he
asks, really know the world “as such” and in such a different manner
from animals who, Heidegger argues, know the world only in a relation of
utility, guided by drives or desires (p. 159)? Might not our language
be proof of our own inability to know the world outside of our own
projects, outside of our own autobiographical efforts, and not the proof
of our true apprehension of the world?
Letting animals be in
their being, outside our projects and outside our will for knowledge,
would, Derrida seems to suggest, constitute the ultimate ethical stance.
As autobiographical animals, however, we may have difficulty, as does
Derrida, thinking a principle of life outside of our own projects. What
we can do is to track and scrutinize those projects, paying particular
attention to how and for what purposes we construct difference. In this
way we may turn away from those tracks that trample upon or claim to
leave others behind in the assertion of our difference. This is the
proto-ethical project that Derrida’s work on the animal undertakes. It
is unfortunate that there will not be more to follow.
Notes
[1]. Matthew Callarco, Zoographies:The Question of the Animal from
Heidegger to Derrida (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008),
110-111.
[2]. Donna Haraway, When Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 20.
[3]. Callarco, Zoographies.